Institutional Analysis of Anti-Administrative Corruption Policymaking in Afghanistan during the Republic Era

Abstract

Administrative corruption in Afghanistan, particularly during the Republic era, has been one of the fundamental challenges of state-building and governance, with wide-ranging consequences for administrative efficiency, social justice, and political legitimacy. This study aims to analyze anti-administrative corruption policymaking in Afghanistan by examining the concept, types, contributing factors, legal and policy frameworks, responsible institutions, and the policymaking process in this field. The research method is descriptive-analytical, and the subject is analyzed through an integrated theoretical framework based on institutionalism, good governance, public choice theory, and the public policy cycle. The findings indicate that administrative corruption in Afghanistan is a structural and multidimensional phenomenon that has emerged and persisted as a result of weak formal institutions, the dominance of informal relations, defective incentive structures, dependence on foreign aid, and the inefficiency of the governance system. Despite the existence of numerous anti-corruption laws, strategies, and institutions, the gap between formal policies and their practical implementation has prevented the achievement of sustainable outcomes. This study concludes that effective combat against administrative corruption requires fundamental institutional reforms, strengthening the rule of law, increasing accountability, and aligning political interests with public objectives.