Comparative Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Frameworks of Public Oversight of Government in the Constitutional Systems of Iran and Iraq

Abstract

Public oversight of governmental performance is one of the fundamental components of democratic systems and serves as a benchmark for evaluating transparency and accountability in the administration of public affairs. Using a comparative approach and a descriptive-analytical method, this study examines the structures and legal instruments enabling public oversight of government in the constitutional systems of Iran and Iraq. In Iran’s legal system, numerous constitutional provisions—including Articles 8, 56, 59, 90, 173, and 174—alongside institutions such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Supreme Audit Court, the General Inspection Organization, and the Administrative Justice Court, constitute the principal mechanisms of public oversight. In contrast, the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, emphasizing the principle of popular sovereignty and the separation of powers, designates institutions such as the Council of Representatives, the Federal Supreme Court, the Commission of Integrity, and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit as key instruments of public oversight. The findings of this study indicate that, although both countries possess advanced legal oversight frameworks, the practical realization of these mechanisms faces serious challenges—stemming from the concentration of power, weak institutional independence, and insufficient enforcement guarantees in Iran, as well as political influence, structural corruption, and partisan pressures in Iraq. Consequently, strengthening transparency, enhancing institutional independence, and institutionalizing a culture of accountability constitute essential prerequisites for the effective realization of public oversight of government in both countries.