The Legal Trap Game in Iranian Criminal Policy: A Criminological Model for Analyzing Preventive Behavior of Police and Offenders in Crime-Conducive Situations

Abstract

The Legal Trap Game, as a novel model in analytical criminology, provides a framework for understanding the interactive behavior between law enforcement agencies and potential offenders in crime-conducive situations. The central issue of this study is to examine how levels of surveillance, punishment costs, and the characteristics of social situations influence offenders’ rational decision-making and the effectiveness of preventive policing approaches within Iranian criminal policy. The objective is to develop a theoretical model for redefining the strategic relationship between offenders and the supervisory system in order to enhance situational deterrence and advance intelligent crime prevention. The present study is theoretical–modeling in nature and is grounded in the conceptual integration of game theory and the principles of situational criminology. The model is designed based on the interaction between two primary actors (the offender and the police), employing a decision matrix and Nash equilibrium to analyze behavioral mechanisms and preventive policies. The research sources include theoretical data, domestic legal texts, and comparative studies concerning prevention models based on situational analysis. The findings of the model indicate that the relationship among the intensity of surveillance, the probability of crime detection, and the costs of punishment is nonlinear and interactive. Increasing the costs of offending, enhancing the probability of surveillance, and strengthening the legitimacy of legal institutions can shift the behavioral equilibrium of the game from law violation toward cooperation and legal compliance. Consequently, dynamic and data-driven surveillance strategies demonstrate the highest effectiveness in reducing crime-conducive situations. The Legal Trap Game provides a conceptual instrument for redesigning Iran’s preventive criminal policy. By integrating game theory and situational criminology, the model enables a rational analysis of offender behavior and police decision-making. The adoption of dynamic surveillance policies, targeted resource allocation, and the redefinition of reward and punishment structures can facilitate the creation of a new social equilibrium in which the likelihood of criminal behavior is minimized and the effectiveness of the prevention system is enhanced.