A Comparative Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Persons Deprived of Volition under Iranian and English Law

Abstract

Criminal responsibility in contemporary legal systems is founded on the commission of voluntary conduct that can be attributed to the perpetrator. Whenever an offender’s volition is impaired or entirely eliminated by internal or external factors, the basis for criminal blameworthiness is correspondingly weakened. Persons deprived of volition—including individuals with insanity, children lacking discernment, persons acting under duress, individuals severely affected by narcotic drugs or alcoholic beverages, and persons who lose control over their conduct due to medication or mental illness—present some of the most significant challenges in the field of criminal responsibility. Adopting a comparative approach, this study examines the criminal responsibility of persons deprived of volition under Iranian and English law. It demonstrates that, although both legal systems recognize the voluntariness of conduct as a fundamental prerequisite for criminal responsibility, they differ significantly in identifying relevant circumstances, evidentiary requirements, legal consequences, and the distinction between complete exculpation and diminished responsibility. Under Iranian law, the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, particularly Articles 149 and 154, constitutes the principal legal framework for analysis. By contrast, under English law, the doctrines and rules governing insanity, automatism, intoxication, and diminished responsibility play a central role. The findings indicate that English law has developed a more precise classification and a broader body of judicial precedent concerning impairments of volition. Iranian law, despite containing express statutory provisions, continues to face theoretical and practical ambiguities in determining the scope of deprivation of volition.