Examining the Proportional Relationship Between the Principle of La-Zarar and Criminal Responsibility: A Review of Imam Khomeini’s Jurisprudential Opinions

Abstract

Fiqh principles can be considered effective tools for deepening and expanding jurisprudential inferences. Among these principles, the rule of La-Zarar (no harm) is one of the most frequently applied and has uniquely diverse interpretations compared to other principles. While its primary applications are typically found in civil matters, the potential for its invocation in criminal law—across various branches such as hudud (fixed punishments), qisas (retributive justice), diyat (blood money), and ta'zirat (discretionary punishments)—necessitates an investigation into its relationship with criminal responsibility. A novel interpretation of this principle has been proposed by Imam Khomeini, which, grounded in his intellectual framework, is articulated as a form of sovereign prohibition (nahy sultani). Considering the influential role of Imam Khomeini’s thought in the legal framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is imperative to assess the extent of his opinion's impact on the principle of La-Zarar within the current legal system. This study, conducted through a descriptive-analytical method and based on library research, addresses issues such as the conceptualization of the La-Zarar principle, the views of jurists regarding it, and seeks to answer the following questions: First, what is the relationship between the La-Zarar principle and criminal responsibility? Second, to what extent has the legislator considered this principle in criminal law, and how closely does this legislative attention align with Imam Khomeini’s interpretation? The findings indicate that, in drafting criminal laws, contrary to Imam Khomeini’s view, the dominant opinion among jurists—which emphasizes the negation of harmful rulings (nafy hukm zarrari)—has served as the foundational basis for legal rulings.