The Validity and Interpretive Status of Applying Indirect Meanings in Legal Texts

Abstract

The interpretation of legal and jurisprudential texts is not confined solely to the explicit denotations of words; rather, many rulings and legal norms are inferable from indirect meanings, particularly from the argument a contrario (mafhum-e mokhalef). This article, adopting an analytical–descriptive approach, examines the validity and interpretive status of indirect meanings in jurisprudential and legal texts and seeks to clarify the scope of their probative authority and practical application. It begins by explicating the concepts of explicit meaning (mantūq) and implicit meaning (mafhum), followed by an analysis of the positions of legal theorists regarding the probative force of the argument a contrario, identifying three principal approaches: absolute validity, absolute invalidity, and the differentiated (conditional) approach. The findings indicate that the existing dispute is largely minor-premise-based, concerning the verification of the exclusive causal role of the qualifying condition, rather than the fundamental legitimacy of the concept itself. Subsequently, the status of the argument a contrario in Iranian positive law is analyzed with particular emphasis on the cautious interpretive theory of Katouzian, and the three jurisprudential, historical, and rational criteria for its validity are articulated. The results demonstrate that indirect meanings—provided that the qualifying condition is established as the exclusive cause of the ruling and that no conflict exists with the general principles of the legal system—constitute an effective instrument for remedying legislative gaps, imposing reasonable limitations on legal norms, and achieving judicial justice. Ultimately, it may be concluded that the differentiated and conditional approach represents the most logical and efficient foundation for employing indirect meanings in the interpretation of jurisprudential and legal texts.