Comparison of Administrative Corruption from the Perspective of Iranian Law and the Merida Convention

Abstract

Financial corruption is a phenomenon that exists, to a greater or lesser extent, in most countries of the world; however, its type, form, extent, and scope vary from one country to another. Similarly, the consequences and outcomes of financial corruption differ depending on the political and economic structure and the level of development of each country. Based on this distinction, the present article aims to compare administrative corruption from the perspective of Iranian law and the Merida Convention. It seeks, through a comparative research method, to identify the main similarities and differences between administrative corruption in Iranian legal provisions and in the Merida Convention. Accordingly, the article raises the following research question: What are the similarities and differences between Iran’s and the Merida Convention’s approaches to administrative corruption? In response, the study hypothesizes that the main commonalities between the Merida Convention and Iranian law in addressing administrative corruption include: bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of property in the private sector, enforcement mechanisms and consequences of corruption, and liability of legal persons. Conversely, the differences between the two frameworks concern: the independence of the judiciary, management of public financial resources, bribery of public officials, and embezzlement and unauthorized use of public property. The findings of the article indicate that the issue of administrative corruption in Iranian law is not grounded in a citizen-centered strategy or in promoting participatory perspectives. Rather, it remains confined to bureaucratic structures and hierarchical approaches. In contrast, discussions of administrative corruption in the Merida Convention not only adopt a participatory approach but also benefit from effective enforcement guarantees.