Iranian and French Criminal Policy toward Offenses against National Security, with Emphasis on Judicial Practice

Abstract

Offenses against national security constitute one of the most significant areas of criminal-law intervention in contemporary legal systems. On the one hand, they are closely associated with preserving the existence of the state, territorial integrity, political independence, and public order; on the other hand, because of their broad conceptual scope and susceptibility to interpretation, they may conflict with fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly freedom of expression, political participation, and fair-trial guarantees. This article comparatively analyzes Iranian and French criminal policy toward offenses against national security, with particular emphasis on judicial practice, and seeks to determine how these two legal systems balance the necessity of protecting national security against the obligation to respect fundamental rights. Using descriptive-analytical and comparative methods and drawing on statutory provisions, legal doctrine, and selected judicial decisions, the study examines the legislative and judicial dimensions of criminal policy in the two countries. The findings indicate that, in both systems, criminal policy toward national security offenses is security-oriented, preventive, and based on early intervention. The principal difference is that Iranian policy focuses more heavily on preserving the political system, safeguarding internal and external security, and protecting the constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic, whereas French policy emphasizes the protection of the fundamental interests of the Nation, republican institutions, public order, and the prevention of terrorism and organized threats. The legislative analysis demonstrates that Iranian law employs relatively broad concepts with considerable potential for expansive interpretation in relation to certain offenses, including assembly and collusion, propaganda against the state, membership in opposition groups, espionage, and certain ḥadd offenses. In France, although security-related criminalization has expanded, particularly in the areas of terrorism and cyber threats, this expansion is accompanied by more effective mechanisms of constitutional, administrative, and judicial review. With regard to judicial practice, the article shows that, in both countries, security-related intent, the organized nature of the conduct, its capacity to disrupt public order, and its connection with threat networks are among the principal criteria for classifying conduct as a national security offense. Nevertheless, Iranian judicial practice continues, in some cases, to face difficulties in precisely distinguishing legitimate political and civil conduct from criminal conduct directed against national security. In France, by contrast, notwithstanding the development of a preventive approach, institutional safeguards and the principle of proportionality play a more prominent role in constraining excessive security-oriented intervention. The article therefore concludes that the fundamental difference between the two systems lies not in the principle of protecting national security, but in the clarity of legal concepts, the quality of judicial oversight, and the scope of safeguards limiting the state’s punitive power.